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WHAT WENT WRONG WITH FRE RULE 609:




Lawyers are a tricky group. We talk in a language all our own using
catch phrases such as "summary judgment," "proximate cause" and
"rule against perpetuities" as if these terms had some magical, mysti-
cal meaning. We have elaborate systems of rules and procedures
which guide the everyday operation of the legal system. The rules are
often so difficult and complex that many lawyers and judges do not
even fully understand them. Problems arise in our system when we
ask ordinary people to come into our world and use our language and
rules to resolve conflicts. Jurors with no legal training may not under-
stand the myriad of rules and language we throw at them during the
course of a trial. Moreover, jurors may not agree with these rules and
may ignore a judge's instructions in order to reach a verdict they feel
is more fair and just. Such is the case with Rule 609 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence ("FRE").
The current version of Rule 609 provides that evidence showing a
criminal defendant has been convicted of prior crimes is generally ad-
missible to attack the defendant's credibility when he or she testifies.1
There are three major exceptions limiting the use of prior convictions
to impeach a witness. 2 First, a court may not allow such prior convic-
tion evidence if the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its
probative value.3 Second, only convictions within the last ten years
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1995 magna cum laude, Wofford College, J.D. 1998 cum laude, Tlane University School of Law.
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1. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (allowing prior conviction evidence to be used against any
witness in either civil or criminal cases). This paper discusses only how the rule applies in crimi-
nal cases to impeach the defendant when he or she takes the stand.
2. The rule also provides other exceptions. Evidence of conviction cannot be used when a
pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation is given. FED. R. EVID. 609(c). Evidence of a
conviction in a juvenile court is generally not admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 609(d).
3. FED. R. EVID. 609(a). This is not required when the prior crimes involved dishonesty or
false statements. Id.
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may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility.4 Third, only mis-
demeanor convictions which involved dishonesty or false statements
or felony convictions may be used.5 Various states have adopted evi-
dence rules which have similar effects with some important
differences.
6
A number of important goals and policies underlie Rule 609. Tradi-
tionally, it was argued that prior convictions were probative of a wit-
ness's credibility.7 Without hearing such evidence a jury might
conclude a criminal defendant led a blameless, honest life and was
unlikely to lie on the witness stand.8 If a criminal defendant has prior
convictions a jury should know about these convictions in order to
more accurately weigh the testimony given.9 These concerns are bal-
anced against the defendant's right to a fair trial. Whenever prior
conviction evidence is allowed the jury may misuse this evidence and
conclude that the defendant's propensity to commit crimes means he
or she must have committed the present crime with which he or she is
charged.' 0 Thus, when the prosecution uses the evidence only as it
reflects on the defendant's credibility, such evidence should not be
used to infer the defendant's propensity to commit crimes makes it
probable he or she committed this crime." Nevertheless, such limit-
ing instructions are not likely to have any effect on jurors.12 It is
widely accepted that in all likelihood a jury will consider the evidence
for improper purposes.' 3 Because of the potential for unfair prejudice
many criminal defendants choose not to testify.' 4 Such a decision may
also have a negative impact on the jury.'"
It is these competing and largely contradictory concerns that have
been at the heart of the debate over the admissibility of prior convic-
tions in criminal cases. This article examines how various courts and
legislatures have attempted to balance these concerns. I begin, in Part
II, by examining the common law rules used in the Federal courts
4. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
5. FED. R. EVID. 606(a) and (b).
6. See discussion infra notes 88-236 and accompanying text.
7. See JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 519 (1979).
8. See Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Poli-
tics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2297 (1994).
9. Id.
10. See Note, Rule 609: Impeachment By Evidence of Conviction of Crime, 12 ToURo L.
REV. 495, 496 n.3 (1996).
11. See MICHAEL R. FoNmtHAM, TRIAL TECHNIQUE AND EVIDENCE, § 7-27 (1995).
12. Id.
13. Id. Professor Fontham states "The restriction of purpose is illusory, because a jury is
likely to consider the evidence in determining guilt as well as credibility." Id.
14. Id.
15. See H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence Seeing Through
the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776 (1993).
2
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before the enactment of the FRE. I then discuss the debate in Con-
gress over the FRE and look at the approach taken by the drafters of
the FRE both before and after the 1990 Amendment to the FRE.
Part III of this article examines various state approaches to the prob-
lem. Specifically, this article concentrates on North Carolina, Hawaii,
Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia, Montana, and California, as each of
these states depart from the FRE and have taken different approaches
to the problem. In Part IV, I consider the English approach which
varies significantly from the American approach at both the state and
federal levels. Part V attacks the assumptions behind Rule 609. Fi-
nally, Part VI reveals what is wrong with allowing prior conviction
evidence in a criminal case.
I conclude by arguing that the various American approaches to the
admission of prior convictions are largely inconsistent with bedrock
principles ingrained in American criminal law. The current rules al-
lowing prior convictions to be admitted should be dropped in favor of
a categorical rule barring the admission of prior convictions for im-
peachment. Current rules, generally allowing prior conviction evi-
dence, place a premium on efficiently convicting people. Moreover,
the current approach is based on unfounded and false assumptions
about jury behavior. Good reasons exist to abandon the approach in
FRE in favor of a rule barring the use of prior conviction evidence
much like the rules adopted in England, Hawaii and a handful of
other jurisdictions.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT WITH
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Under the common law, a criminal defendant was not allowed to
testify on his or her own behalf.' 6 However, in the United States it
has long been recognized that the Constitution gives a criminal de-
fendant the right to participate in his or her defense and take the
stand if he or she chooses.' 7 The Court has also recognized that evi-
dence of prior convictions may not be used to prove that the defend-
ant has a propensity to commit crimes nor that he or she therefore
committed the crime with which he or she is currently charged.' 8
However, there is no constitutional requirement restricting the use of
prior conviction evidence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibil-
ity as a witness.' 9
16. See infra note 237.
17. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
18. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
19. Id.
3
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The current version of FRE Rule 609 was developed from this con-
stitutional backdrop. Prior to 1965, circuit courts used various rules to
determine if prior conviction evidence should be admissible, but the
general rule was that most prior conviction evidence was admissible to
impeach criminal defendants.2' In 1965, the D.C. Circuit handed
down Luck v. United States, which significantly influenced the way cir-
cuit courts viewed prior conviction evidence.21 The decision in Luck
had significant influence on the drafters of the FRE.22 In Luck, the
D.C. Circuit interpreted an evidence statute which provided in rele-
vant part: "No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or
criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of a
crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a
witness, either by cross-examination of the witness or by evidence.
''23
The D.C. Circuit Court interpreted the statute as giving the trial
court judge the discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the prejudi-
cial effect substantially outweighed the probative value of the evi-
dence.24 The court also noted the dilemma to a criminal defendant
when impeachment is allowed through prior conviction evidence.25
Nevertheless, the Circuit Court held that such evidence is ordinarily
admissible, but it warned that it is more important for a jury to "hear
the defendant's story" than to know of a prior conviction.26 The
court's approach in Luck was a compromise.27 The court neither al-
lowed nor excluded per se prior conviction evidence offered to im-
peach.28 Instead, the court adopted a balancing approach that gave
significant discretion to trial judges in determining whether prior con-
viction evidence should be admitted or excluded. 29 The Luck case
was significant because it marked one of the first times an American
court was willing to acknowledge the prejudicial effect of prior convic-
tion evidence, and it empowered trial judges to exclude such evidence
in certain cases.
20. See C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICx ON EVIDENCE, § 43 (3d. ed. 1983).
21. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2299-2301.
23. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1998).




28. Id. at 769. See also Leslie L. Hayes, Prior Conviction Impeachment in the District of
Columbia: What Happened When the Courts Ran Out of Luck?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1159-
1160 (1986) (stating the court's interests in adopting an approach which neither automatically
included nor excluded prior conviction evidence).
29. Luck, 348 F.2d at 767-68.
4
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Following Luck, other circuit courts began to use the Luck balanc-
ing approach.3" In 1970, Congress changed the evidence rule inter-
preted in Luck and removed all discretion from courts to exclude
prior conviction evidence for impeachment.3 Nevertheless, the Luck
doctrine remained important throughout the drafting of the FRE.
The preliminary draft of Rule 609 rejected the reasoning in Luck and
did not rely on the Luck doctrine.32 Under this initial draft, trial
judges had no discretion to exclude admissible prior conviction evi-
dence for impeachment.33
After hearing criticism on the initial draft3 4 , a second version of
FRE Rule 609(a) was completed in 1971. 35 The second draft was es-
sentially the same as the first draft, but specifically incorporated the
doctrine in Luck. This draft allowed discretion to exclude otherwise
admissible prior conviction evidence if "the judge determines that the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."36 Following the second draft of the FRE
and Rule 609 the drafters received more criticism.37 The drafters
eventually submitted a draft of FRE Rule 609 to Congress which did
not incorporate the doctrine in Luck and provided for no discretion-
ary review of prior conviction evidence by trial judges.38 After debate
and substantial revision by the House Judiciary Committee, a version
of FRE Rule 609 was drafted which allowed impeachment with prior
30. See, e.g., United States v. Greenberg, 419 F.2d 808, 809 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Allison, 414 F.2d. 407, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1969).
31. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305. Section 14-305 mandates that all prior conviction evi-
dence be admitted for impeachment purposes. Id.
32. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 295-296 (1969). In relevant part, Rule 609(a) provided:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime: (1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statements regardless of the punishment.
Id.
33. Id. at 296-99 (advisory committee notes).
34. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2299-2301.
35. Revised draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 391 (1971) (revised draft). In relevant part, the rule provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted
of a crime except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime: (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he
was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty of false statement regardless of the punishment,
unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of
the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Id.
36. Id.
37. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2301-02.
38. RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183,
269 (1972).
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convictions "only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement."
This draft was submitted to the full House for debate.39
A review of the House debate is revealing. Representatives ex-
pressed many concerns over issues of fairness to both the prosecution
and to the defendant.40 Two amendments were eventually offered.4'
The First Amendment sought to expand the types of prior conviction
evidence that could be used to include most crimes not just those
which showed dishonesty or false statement.42 Proponents of this
amendment justified it on the ground that all prior crimes were rele-
vant to a jury in evaluating a witness's credibility.43 Proponents of this
amendment argued that any prior criminal record evidenced a poor
character that a jury should know about in its evaluation of the wit-
ness's testimony.44 These proponents showed little concern for the
rights of criminal defendants and down played the prejudicial effect of
prior conviction evidence.45
A second amendment incorporated the Luck doctrine by giving
judges the discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial prior conviction
evidence.46 The primary purpose of the second amendment was to
insure that a trial judge could exclude evidence of prior convictions
that were unfairly prejudicial to the criminal defendant.47 Proponents
showed considerable concern for the rights of criminal defendants.48
39. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2302-03.
40. See 120 CONG. REc. 1414-15, 2375-2381 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1974 & Feb. 6, 1974). Com-
ments by House Representatives included:
I am in sympathy with what the gentleman is trying to do, but this troubles me to no end
because what we are doing on the one hand is supposedly giving something to a defendant,
and with the way the prosecutions are going today, taking a lot away from him by not being
able to discredit government witnesses except within a very limited scope.
Id. at 2378 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974) (statement by Rep. Brasco).
41. Id. at 2375-81.
42. Id. at 1414-15.
43. Id. at 2376. Comments by Rep. Hogan are revealing. He stated inter alia:
Should a witness with an antisocial background be allowed to stand on the same basis of
believability before juries as law-abiding citizens with unblemished records? I think
not... This is not to say that people with criminal records necessarily lie, but is to say that
juries should weigh the criminal record in determining credibility.. .Personally I am more
concerned about the moral worth of individuals capable of engaging in is such outrageous
acts as adversely reflecting on a witness' character than I am of thieves and that comparison
justifies any amendment....
Id. (statement of Rep. Hogan).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2377. The amendment provided that only if a crime was punishable death or year
or more and the "court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative
value of the evidence of the conviction" would it be allowed. Id.
47. Id. at 2377-79.
48. Id. at 2375-81. Referring to rule which allowed judicial discretion and expanded those
convictions which could be used to impeach, Rep. Dennis stated:
Now Mr. Chairman, that is one of the most unfair rules of law that we have... I spent 4
years as a prosecuting attorney in the State of Indiana, prosecuting on behalf of the State. I
6
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Representative Wiggins suggested that because of the potential for
unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant, a separate rule should be
drafted which pertained only to criminal defendants.49 Eventually,
both amendments failed and the original version of the bill passed in
the House.50 Impeachment by prior conviction evidence became not
only a popular topic in the law reviews but was a political debate unto
itself. Professor Gold points out that the House debate on Rule 609
alone consumed more pages in the Congressional Record than the de-
bate over the rest of the FRE rules combined.5'
A similar debate ensued in the Senate. After substantial debate
and discussion in the Senate Judiciary Committee 52 , a revised version
of FRE Rule 609 was adopted.53 The revised version of the bill made
all crimes showing dishonesty or false statement admissible.54 The
version also allowed a criminal defendant to be impeached with prior
conviction evidence if the crime was punishable by death or imprison-
ment for over a year and the probative value of the evidence out-
weighed its prejudicial effect.55 An amendment was offered which
would have removed the discretion of the courts to exclude prior con-
viction evidence and which would have allowed all prior conviction
evidence punishable by death or imprisonment for over a year.56 A
sharp debate ensued on the Senate floor.57 Most of the comments
centered around the need to protect society and balance the rights of
criminal defendants.58 There was also considerable debate concerning
spent another year in the Army as a judge advocate officer, prosecuting for the Govern-
ment, and I have defended a lot of defendants in criminal cases since. My experience is
that, from either side of the table, this is utterly unfair.. .Studies have shown that the one
single reason, the one greatest reason, for miscarriages of justice is faulty eyewitness testi-
mony. However, about the next highest is this very rule, because people are either fright-
ened off the stand, and do not tell their story, or else they take the stand and are crucified by
being asked about entirely irrelevant offenses... All we are doing here is holding those
questions down to crimes which do in fact bear on credibility [referring to the original rule
from the judiciary committee] which is the theory of asking him anything at all, and we are
preventing prosecution just because the man has a bad character.
Id. at 2377 (statement of Rep. Dennis).
49. Id. at 2379. Rep. Wiggins stated inter alia:
The difficulty here is we are dealing with a complex problem and are trying to fashion a
single rule adequate to take care of the problem. It suggests to me further draftsmanship is
necessary to spin off criminal cases from civil cases.. But let us not underestimate for one
moment the prejudicial impact of permitting an inquiry into unrelated prior crimes by a
man who is a party defendant in a criminal trial.
Id. (statement by Rep. Wiggins).
50. Id. at 2394.
51. See Gold, supra note 8, 2302-03.





57. See 120 CONG. REC. 37076-83 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974).
58. Id. Senator McClellan stated:
7
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a judge's limiting instruction and whether these instructions would
have any real effect.59
Eventually, the amended version of FRE 609(a) passed by a narrow
margin.6' Because the Senate and House version of FRE Rule 609(a)
varied significantly, the Conference Committee had the task of recon-
ciling the two versions.61 The text of the reconciled version of FRE
Rule 609 provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishon-
esty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.62
The reconciled version of FRE Rule 609 was a compromise between
the House and Senate version.63 The Committee's rule allowed prior
conviction evidence of all felonies, but also incorporated the Luck
doctrine giving the trial judge discretion to exclude the evidence if the
prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.64 Crimes evidenc-
Does not society deserve the kind of protection that will allow the jury to have these facts -
so that it can properly choose between the man who says, "I saw him there; I saw him
commit the crime," and the man who says, "I did not do it?" Are we going to once again
say to society, "You have no protection any more?" Why do we keep going so far? The
further we go in loosening up the law, the more and more crime increases. Will we never
learn? Everything today is being done to find some way to protect the criminal, while soci-
ety is forgotten.
Id. at 37081 (statement by Sen. McClellan). Senator Kennedy stated:
Mr. President, all authorities agree that the greatest source of prejudice to a defendant is a
prior felony conviction. Thus many innocent defendants will not take the stand to testify in
their own defense, if a prior felony conviction can be used against them. Jurors may con-
clude that the defendant is guilty because he has not taken the stand. On the other hand, if
the defendant does not testify, the jury may base its verdict on his prior conviction, rather
than solely on the evidence before it.
Id. at 37080 (statement by Sen. Kennedy).
59. Id. Senator Hruska stated:
There may be some prejudice to the defendant, I recognize, in admitting evidence that the
defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. But to a substantial degree, this preju-
dice can be instigated by an instruction to the jury that the prior convictions are admitted
only for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness and not to prove any pro-
pensity on the part of the defendant to be a felon.
Id. at 37077 (statement by Sen. Hruska). Senator Hart responded:
[Djoes anyone really seriously think that a careful instruction to the jury will serve to re-
move from the minds of the jurors the existence of the prior conviction? I do not think one
has to have spent a lifetime in criminal litigation to know that we are kidding ourselves if we
think that the instruction removes the poison.
Id. at 37078 (statement by Sen. Hart).
60. Id. at 37083. The vote was 38 to 33 with 29 Senators not voting. Id.
61. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2303-03.
62. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
63. See Gold, supra note 8, at 2307.
64. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
8
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ing dishonesty or false Statement were automatically admissible and
the trial judge had no discretion to exclude the evidence regardless of
its prejudicial effect.65 This compromised version of FRE Rule 609
passed both the House and Senate and became effective in 1975.66
While FRE Rule 609 attempted to strike a compromise between the
need to admit prior conviction evidence to impeach a witness and the
accused's right to a fair trial, those favoring greater admission of prior
conviction evidence got the better end of the compromise. Statistical
studies have shown that the supposed safeguards of FRE Rule 609
have provided little, if any, real protection to criminal defendants.67
Despite the rule's effect, the 1975 version of FRE Rule 609 remained
the law until 1990 when a new version of FRE Rule 609 was enacted.68
The new version of FRE Rule 609 was sparked by a controversial
Supreme Court decision, Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.
6 9
Green involved a civil plaintiff who was severely injured when his arm
was caught in a large dryer and severed.70 The defense used prior
conviction evidence to impeach the plaintiff.7 The jury awarded no
damages apparently because of the prior conviction evidence.7" The
court noted that reading FRE Rule 609 literally, it provided discretion
to trial judges to exclude prejudicial evidence only when evidence af-
fects the defendant.73 The rule literally provided no protection to civil
plaintiffs but would afford protection to civil defendants.74 The Court
reasoned that Congress could not have intended such a result because
it made no sense to allow impeachment of a civil defendant and not a
civil plaintiff.75 Relying on the rule's legislative history, the Court
concluded when Congress used the word "defendant" in FRE Rule
609 it must have intended this to mean only a criminal defendant.76
Accordingly, the Court held that FRE Rule 609 gave trial courts no
discretion to exclude otherwise admissible prior conviction evidence
in civil cases.77
In amending FRE Rule 609, Congress sought to overrule the
Court's decision in Green and give trial courts the discretion to ex-
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See discussion infra notes 279-382 and accompanying text.
68. See 129 F.R.D. 347 (1990)(amendments to the FED R. EVID. 609).
69. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
70. Id. at 506.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Green, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., Concurring).
74. Id. at 510-11.
75. Id. at 522-27.
76. Id. at 527.
77. Id.
9
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cluded prior conviction evidence in civil cases. 78 Despite a mountain
of evidence showing prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence in
criminal cases,7 9 the amended version of FRE Rule 609 had little ef-
fect on criminal cases.8" The amended version of the rule provides in
relevant part:
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence
that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under
which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has
been convicted of such crime shall be admitted if the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its preju-
dicial effect to the accused; or (2) evidence that any witness has been
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.8 '
Despite mounting evidence that impeachment with prior conviction
evidence against criminal defendants is highly prejudicial and cannot
be cured by a judge's limiting instruction,82 the drafters and Congress
showed no concern for changing the rule as it. pertained to criminal
defendants. The current version of FRE Rule 609 has the same effect
on criminal defendants as the 1975 version of the rule.83 Crimes of
dishonesty or false statement are automatically admissible regardless
of punishment." A trial judge does not have discretion to exclude
impeachment by these types of crimes.85 Any crime punishable by
death or imprisonment for 1 year or more is admissible.86 However, a
trial judge may exclude this type of evidence when the prejudicial
value of the evidence outweighs the probative value of the evidence.87
78. See 129 F.R.D. at 353.
79. See discussion infra notes 279-382 and accompanying text.
80. See generally 129 F.R.D. at 353 (committee note explaining the new rule on cross-
examination).
81. FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
82. See discussion infra notes 279-382 and accompanying text.




87. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(advisory committee notes).
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III. STATE APPROACHES TO IMPEACHMENT WITH
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
A. Expanding the Use of Prior Conviction Evidence: The North
Carolina Approach
North Carolina adopted the FRE with certain exceptions.88 The
North Carolina version of Rule 609 gives prosecutors more leeway
than the FRE version of Rule 609.89 North Carolina's version of Rule
609 provides in relevant part: "For the purpose of attacking the credi-
bility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than sixty days confinement shall be admitted if
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-
examination." 90
The North Carolina rule departs from the FRE in a number of im-
portant respects. First, the North Carolina rule expands the types of
convictions that can be used for impeachment by including all convic-
tions punishable by more than sixty days.91 In contrast, FRE Rule 609
restricts prior convictions to those that are punishable by death or im-
prisonment for more than a year.92 Second, unlike the FRE, there is
no requirement in North Carolina that misdemeanor crimes evidence
dishonesty, false statement, or deceit.93 The only requirement is that
the crime be punishable for more than sixty days.94 Finally, prior con-
viction evidence is per se admissible in North Carolina.95 North Caro-
lina removes the trial court's discretion to exclude impeachment
evidence of prior convictions if its prejudicial effect outweighs the pro-
bative value of the evidence. 96 The political compromise that was pur-
portedly reached when Congress adopted the FRE in 197597 was not
reached in North Carolina. The result is the rule that heavily favors
prosecutors while giving criminal defendants little protection.
The current version of North Carolina Rule 609 is more restrictive
than an earlier version of the rule.98 Prior to 1983, there was no re-
striction on how far back a prosecutor could go to drag in prior con-
viction evidence.99 In 1983, the rule was changed and the legislature
adopted the ten-year period which is also applied in the federal




92. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).




97. See discussion supra notes 40-66 and accompanying text.
98. See Alston v. Herrick, 76 N.C. App. 246, 251, 332 S.E.2d 720, 723-24 (1985).
99. Id.
11
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rule.100 Moreover, before 1983 North Carolina followed the common
law and admitted all conviction evidence regardless of the offense or
punishment.'
Despite changes to the rule, North Carolina's version of Rule 609
remains one of the broadest in the country. Most states which de-
parted from the FRE have adopted rules which allow prosecutors to
use prior conviction evidence to a more limited extent than allowed
under the federal rule. North Carolina is one of only a handful of
states which has expanded the use of prior conviction evidence.'
0 2
B. Disallowing Impeachment With Prior Conviction Evidence: The
Approach in Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia and
Montana
Most states have adopted some version of the FRE but states have
taken a number of alternative approaches to impeachment with prior
conviction evidence. Hawaii was the first state to adopt a version of
Rule 609 which departed from the FRE and disallowed the use of
prior conviction evidence to impeach a criminal defendant. 3
Hawaii's current limitation developed in the early 1970's and pre-
dated the adoption of a modified version of the FRE. In 1970, the
Hawaii Rules of Evidence allowed for impeachment of a witness with
evidence of "felonies, or of misdemeanors involving moral turpi-
tude." The Hawaii Supreme Court showed concern for the rule not-
ing that many criminal convictions had little if any probative value on
a witness's credibility."° In State v. Santiago, the Hawaii Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of impeaching a criminal defendant with
prior conviction evidence, and ruled the practice unconstitutional
based on the state constitution.'05 Citing Bruton v. United States
10 6
the Hawaii Court noted that there were some contexts in which a jury
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See generally MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (West 1997) (allowing impeachment
with some misdemeanors not involving dishonesty); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.050 (West 1997) (al-
lowing impeachment with any criminal conviction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 609 (West 1997) (allowing
impeachment with any criminal conviction unless remote or for other cause); Wis STAT. ANN.
§ 906.09 (West 1997) (allowing impeachment with any criminal conviction).
103. See State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 662 (Haw. 1971).
104. See Asato v. Furtado, 474 P.2d 288, 294 (Haw. 1970). The Court wrote "We think that
there are a great many criminal offenses the conviction of which has no bearing whatsoever upon
the witness's propensity for lying or truth telling, and that such convictions out not to be admit-
ted for purposes of impeachment." Id.
105. Santiago, 492 P.2d at 657 (Haw. 1971).
106. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). The Court wrote "[T]here are some
contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored." Id.
12
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was incapable of obeying a trial court's limiting instruction.10 7 The
court went on to argue that jurors would infer that because of his or
her prior convictions the defendant must have committed the crime
with which he or she was charged.10 8 While a defendant always has a
right to testify he would feel unduly restrained from doing so if he had
prior convictions.10 9 The court concluded that this fact would uncon-
stitutionally penalize a defendant for exercising his or her right to tes-
tify and it held that the Hawaii evidence rules could not be read to
impose such unconstitutional burdens on a defendant." 0 The court
also believed prior conviction evidence provided little assistance to
the jury in weighing the defendant's credibility as a witness."' It ar-
gued the prosecution had other available means by which to impeach
a defendant or to show that his or her testimony should not be be-
lieved by jurors."
12
Nothing in the Hawaiian constitution or the Hawaiian evidence
code mandated the court's decision.1 13 However, the court concluded
that the rule allowing impeachment by prior conviction evidence did
not afford a criminal defendant sufficient protection from unfair prej-
udice." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Hawaiian court made a
number of assumptions about how jurors reason without evidentiary
support for these assumptions." 5 First, the court assumed a jury
would use the information in an impermissible way, inferring from the
fact that the defendant had a criminal record he or she must have a
propensity to commit crimes and that he or she therefore committed
the crime with which he is charged." 6 Second, the court assumed a
jury could not or would not follow a judge's limiting instruction." 7 At
the time Santiago was decided, some scientific evidence existed sup-
porting these assumptions.'1 8 However, the Hawaii Supreme Court
did not cite to this evidence and did not seem aware of it when they
handed down their decision." 9 Today, however, scientific evidence
107. Santiago, 492 P.2d at 660.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court stated "While technically the defendant with prior convictions may still be
free to testify, the admission of prior convictions to impeach credibility 'is a penalty imposed by
courts for exercising a constitutional privilege.' " Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
614 (1965)).
110. Id. at 660-61.
111. Id. at 661.
112. Id.
113. Id.




118. See discussion infra notes 279-316 and accompanying text.
119. Santiago, 492 P.2d at 660-61.
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shows quite convincingly the court's assumptions were well-founded.
Juries, in fact, ignore judges' limiting instructions and juries do use
prior conviction evidence for impermissible purposes.
121
Since the Santiago decision, Hawaii has adopted a version of the
FRE which departs from the federal approach in Rule 609.121 Consis-
tent with Santiago, the current version does not allow a criminal de-
fendant to be impeached with prior conviction evidence. 122 Like the
English rule,'123 Hawaii allows a prosecutor to impeach a defendant
with prior conviction evidence if the defendant brings his or her char-
acter into question.124 In essence, the rule protects a criminal defend-
ant so long as he or she does not try to bolster his or her credibility by
misleading jurors or testifying in some way to a blameless life.125
Following Hawaii's lead, Pennsylvania adopted rules of evidence
which prohibit impeachment by prior conviction evidence. 126 How-
ever, Pennsylvania courts have wavered as to how strictly the rule
must be enforced. In Commonwealth v. Gray, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court attempted to provide a criminal defendant with maximum
protection under the Pennsylvania impeachment rule. 2 7 Gray in-
volved a defendant who was charged with burglary for allegedly
breaking into a store and stealing a television and some scales. 128 At
trial the prosecutor asked the defendant about prior convictions but
the defense attorney did not object.129 The defendant was convicted
120. See discussion infra notes 279-382 and accompanying text.
121. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 626-1 (1998). The Hawaii version of 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been
convicted of a crime is inadmissible except when the crime is one involving dishonesty.
However, in a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the defendant shall not be
questioned or evidence introduced as to whether the defendant has been convicted of a
crime, for the sole purpose of attacking credibility, unless the defendant has oneself intro-
duced testimony for the purpose of establishing the defendant's credibility as a witness in
which case the defendant shall be treated as any other witness as provided in this rule.
Id.
122. Id.
123. See discussion infra notes 237-275 and accompanying text.
124. HAw. REV. STAT. § 626-1.
125. Id.
126. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5918 (West 1997). The statute provides:
No person charged with any crime and called as a witness in his own behalf, shall be asked,
or if asked, shall be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has commit-
ted, or been charged with, or been convicted of any offense other than the one wherewith he
shall then be charged, or tending to show that he has been of bad character or reputation
unless:
(1) he shall have at such trial, personally or by counsel, asked questions of the witness for
the prosecution with a view to establish his own good reputation or character, or has
given evidence tending to prove his own good character or reputation; or
(2) he shall have testified at such trial against a codefendant, charged with the same offense.
Id.
127. Commonwealth v. Gray, 443 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
128. Id. at 331-32.
129. Id. at 332.
14
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and appealed his conviction on the ground his attorney was ineffective
because he did not object to the use of prior conviction evidence.13 °
The state conceded that the questioning at trial was improper, but ar-
gued the conviction should stand because the questioning was harm-
less error. 31 The state noted the evidence of guilt was strong and the
case was tried before a judge, not a jury.132 The superior court re-
jected the state's argument. 33 It held the evidence rule disallowing
impeachment with prior conviction evidence applied regardless of
who the trier of fact was.134 The appellate court could not conclude
that the failure to object was ineffective assistance of counsel. How-
ever, the court vacated the sentence and remanded the case to deter-
mine if the counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance
of counsel.'
35
Other Pennsylvania courts have been more reluctant in protecting
criminal defendants. In Commonwealth v. Kearse, a defendant on trial
for robbery defended himself by testifying he was home sick the day
of the robbery. 3 6 The defendant also produced two witnesses to ver-
ify his alibi.' 37 Neither witness could testify to the exact day of the
defendant's illness.138 The trial court allowed prior conviction evi-
dence because it believed the credibility of the defendant was a signifi-
cant part of the state's case and it found the prejudicial effect of the
prior conviction evidence minimal. 139 The defendant was convicted
and appealed arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the prior
conviction evidence. 140 The appellate court rejected this argument.' 4 1
It held admission of prior conviction evidence was "within the sound
discretion" of the trial court.142 The court argued the trial judge prop-
erly weighed the competing interests and the appellate court could not
conclude the judge abused his discretion. 43 Accordingly, it affirmed
the conviction.' 44 The Pennsylvania courts' use of a balancing test is
odd given the plain language of the statute disallowing prior convic-
tion evidence to impeach a criminal defendant. Nowhere in the stat-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 332-33.
133. Id. at 333.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Commonwealth v. Kearse, 473 A.2d 577, 578-79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 579.
140. Id. at 578.
141. Id. at 582.
142. Id. at 579.
143. Id. at 580.
144. Id. at 582.
15
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ute does the legislature provide for any balancing test, but
Pennsylvania courts have consistently used such a test. Nevertheless,
the rule in Pennsylvania provides criminal defendants with considera-
bly more protection than Rule 609 of the FRE and similar state rules.
A similar approach was adopted in Kansas. The rule in Kansas
provides:
If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding, no evidence of
his or her conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole pur-
pose of impairing his or her credibility unless the witness has first in-
troduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his
or her credibility.' 45
Kansas courts have viewed the rule strictly and have afforded defend-
ants protection only when there is no bolstering of credibility. Any
assertion of good character by a defendant or his or her witness makes
impeachment with prior conviction evidence appropriate. For exam-
ple, in State v. Johnson, the defendant took the stand in a robbery
case.' 46 The defendant testified he was "presently telling the truth"
and the trial court admitted prior convictions to impeach his credibil-
ity. 147 The court reasoned this statement was an attempt to emphasize
his credibility and by making this statement, the defendant opened the
door to impeachment with prior conviction evidence. 48 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals of Kansas affirmed the holding and stated that
any statement bolstering credibility opened the door to impeachment
with prior conviction evidence. 49
Other states with similar rules have afforded criminal defendants
more protection. Georgia followed Hawaii's lead and enacted an evi-
dence rule similar to that in Hawaii. 5°
In relevant part, the Georgia statute provides:
If a defendant testifies, he shall be sworn as any other witness and may
be examined and cross-examined as any other witness, except that no
evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admis-
sible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in
issue.'
5 '
Unlike the rule under the FRE and in most states, Georgia law does
not provide that a criminal defendant puts his or her character in issue
merely by testifying at his or her own trial.' 52 Instead, the defendant
145. KAN. CIY. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-421 (West 1997).
146. State v. Johnson, 907 P.2d 144, 146 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 146-147.
150. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20 (Harrison 1996).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Height v. State, 448 S.E.2d 726, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Villkey v. State, 450
S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
16
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must testify to his or her own good character, making misleading
statements about his or her prior record or elicit testimony from other
witnesses about his or her good reputation before a prosecutor may
introduce prior. conviction evidence.153
The Georgia rule gives the defendant considerably more protection
from unfair prejudice than Federal Rule 609. It also provides greater
protection than the rule in Pennsylvania or Kansas as interpreted by
those states' courts. However, the Georgia rule affords a defendant
protection only as long as he or she does not attempt to mislead a jury
by bolstering his or her reputation.' 54 When a defendant testifies as to
his or her good character the prosecutor is free to use prior conviction
evidence to impeach the defendant's credibility.'55 The Georgia
Court of Appeals explained the bolstering exception in King v.
State.156 In King, the defendant was arrested for trafficking cocaine.
157
At trial, the defendant took the stand and testified on his own be-
half.'58 On cross-examination the prosecutor asked the defendant if
he knew the price of crack cocaine. 159 The defendant responded, "I
don't smoke marijuana. I don't snort, shoot, or base no cocaine. "160
At that point the trial court determined the defendant had put his
character in issue and the court allowed the prosecutor to present
prior conviction evidence regarding other drug-related crimes.161 The
defendant was eventually convicted and appealed the conviction.
62
On appeal, the court held the use of prior conviction evidence was
proper.163 It reasoned that because the defendant had previously
been convicted of drug related charges, his answer to the prosecutor's
question was deceptive and misleading.' 64 The prosecutor's use of
prior conviction evidence was proper because it showed directly that
the defendant was untruthful. 65 By volunteering information that
was misleading, the court held the defendant had put his character in
issue and was no longer protected by the Georgia evidence law.
1 6 6
Georgia courts have recognized other exceptions to the rule disal-
lowing impeachment by prior conviction evidence against criminal de-
153. See Wilkey, 450 S.E.2d at 847.
154. See, e.g., King v. State, 416 S.E.2d 842, 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 843.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 844.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 843.
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fendants. 167 These other exceptions basically follow those outlined in
Rule 404(b) of the FRE. Rule 404(b) generally allows the prosecutor
to use prior conviction evidence, regardless of whether the defendant
testifies, when the evidence is offered to prove motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident. For the most part, Georgia law follows these exceptions.
Montana has gone further than any other state in disallowing im-
peachment with prior conviction evidence. The rule in Montana pro-
vides; "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime is not admissi-
ble." '168 The Montana rule is broad as it applies to all witnesses in civil
and criminal cases. Moreover, the plain language of the rule appears
to allow any witness, including a criminal defendant, to bolster his or
her credibility. However, the courts in Montana have carved out ex-
ceptions to the rule. Most importantly, the courts have not allowed
witnesses to bolster their credibility by making false statements about
past convictions. 16 9 Thus, when a criminal defendant testifies that he
or she is not the kind of person who could commit the crime with
which he or she is currently charged, the courts have allowed prosecu-
tors to impeach such witnesses with prior conviction evidence.' 70 In
addition, Montana courts have allowed prosecutors more latitude in
bringing out the details of prior convictions without asking if the wit-
ness was convicted. 171 For example, in State v. Martin, the defendant
was charged with various sex crimes against minors and called his wife
to testify on his behalf.'72 In a previous case, the wife had perjured
herself by corroborating an alibi and was convicted of perjury. 173 The
trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask the defendant's wife if she
had ever given false testimony in a case, but it did not allow the prose-
cutor to ask if she had been convicted for perjury or any other of-
fense. 174 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed this decision holding
the trial court's decision was proper under Montana evidence law.175
Despite these exceptions, the Montana courts have afforded crimi-
nal defendants considerable protection from the prejudicial effects of
prior conviction evidence. However, the approach adopted by Ha-
167. See, e.g., Kilgore v. State, 305 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 1983) (allowing prior conviction evidence
of similar crime to show identity); Lord v. State, 406 S.E.2d 137 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing
evidence of previous robbery to show identify of defendant).
168. MoNT. Rv. R. EviD. 609.
169. See, e.g., State v. Austad, 641 P.2d 1373 (Mont. 1982).
170. Id. at 1383-84.
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waii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia and Montana remains a minority
view in the United States. Other than these five states, evidence rules
in other states allow impeachment of a criminal defendant with prior
conviction evidence to one degree or another.176 The approaches in
these five states have also received little support from law professors
or legal scholars. Of the numerous law review articles written on FRE
Rule 609 and similar state rules, few have considered evidence laws
from these states.'
77
C. Departing From the Federal Approach: California's Law on
Impeachment With Prior Conviction Evidence
Prior to 1982, section 788 of the California Evidence Code was simi-
lar to the current FRE approach taken in Rule 609. Section 788 al-
lowed prosecutors to impeach a criminal defendant with prior
conviction evidence. 178 The evidence code limited prior conviction
impeachment to felonies.179  In People v. Beagle, the California
Supreme Court held that prior convictions were not admissible per se
but were subject to a balancing test. 8 ° Section 352 of the California
Evidence Code provides that otherwise admissible evidence may be
excluded in the trial court's discretion "if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will....
create substantial danger of unfair prejudice.... ,,lS Overruling a
long line of decisions by the California courts of appeal, the court held
176. See ALA. R. EVID. 609; ARK. R. EVID. 609; ARIZ. R. EvID. 609; COLO STAT. § 13-90-
101; CONN. R. CMT. 609; DEL. CT. C.P.R. 609; FLA. ST. § 90.610; IDAHO R. REV. 609; ILL. ST.
CH. 735 § 5/8-101; IND. ST. REV. 609; IOWA R. REV. 609; Ky. REV. STAT. § 609; LA. C. E. ANN.
art. 609.1; ME CODE R. § 609; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 21; MD R. Evln. 609; MICH. R. REV.
MRE 609; MINN. ST. REV. Rule 609; Miss. REV. Rule 609; MONT. ST 491.050; NEB. R. REV. ST.
§ 27-609; NEV ST 50.095; N.H. R. REv. Rule 609; N.J. R.E. 609; N.M. R. REV. Rule 11-609; N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. § 60.40; N.D. R. REV. Rule 609; OHIO ST. REV. Rule 609; OKLA. ST. T. 12 § 2609;
OR. R. REv. Rule 609; R.I. R. REV. Rule 609; S.C. R. REv. Rule 609; S.D. ST. § 19-14-12; TENN.
R. REV. Rule 609; TEX. R. REV. Rule 609; UTAH R. REV. Rule 609; VT. R. REV. Rule 609; VA
ST. § 19.2-269; W. VA. R. REV. Rule 609; WASH. R. REV. E.R. 609; WiS. ST. 906.09; Wyo. R.
REV. Rule 609.
177. See Robert Banks, Jr., Some Comparisons Between the New Tennessee Rules of Evi-
dence and the Federal Rules of Evidence Part 11, 20 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 499 (1990); Steven L.
Friedlander, Using Prior Corporate Convictions to Impeach, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1313 (1990); Gold,
supra note 8; Edward J. Imwinkelried & Miguel A. Mendez, Resurrecting California's Old Law
on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005 (1992); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the Presump-
tions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135 (1989);
Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113 (1984); Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove
Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 (1982).
178. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (1966). In relevant part the code provides "For the purpose
of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by the examination of the witness or by
the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony .... Id.
179. Id.
180. People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972)
181. Id. at 7.
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section 788 was subject to the balancing test articulated in section
352.182 The balancing test was similar to the one adopted by the D.C.
Circuit in Luck v. United States183 which the California court cited.'
84
Beagle involved a criminal defendant on trial for arson.'8 5 The trial
court allowed the impeachment of Mr. Beagle with a prior conviction
for writing bad checks. 86 The California Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction. 87 The court reasoned that issuing bad checks tended to
reflect poorly on Mr. Beagle's character and was relevant for that pur-
pose. 88 In addition, the conviction was not remote as it was less than
four years old.'8 9 On the other side of the scale, the court found little
to indicate that admission of the conviction would prejudice Mr. Bea-
gle since the nature of the prior offense was not one likely to inflame
the jury."9 The court provided guidance to trial courts weighing the
probative value of prior conviction evidence against the prejudicial
effect.' 9 ' Citing Luck v. United States,192 the court noted that crimes
which involved deceit, such as fraud or stealing, reflect on the honesty
of a witness.193 However, acts of violence generally show little about a
witness' honesty and are irrelevant for impeachment purposes.194 The
court also noted there were strong reasons for excluding prior convic-
tion evidence when the conviction was for the same offense with
which the defendant is currently charged. 95 Such evidence would
very likely lead jurors to conclude that because a defendant commit-
ted the same crime in the past he must have also committed the one
for which he is charged.196 Beagle also made clear that even when
prior conviction evidence is relevant to impeach a defendant, a trial
court may exclude the evidence if it believes that admission of the
evidence would persuade a defendant not to testify.' 97 In reasoning
similar to that used by the Hawaii Supreme Court to disallow such
evidence on state constitutional grounds,198 the California court
noted that the defendant's version of what happened may be so im-
182. Id.
183. See discussion supra notes 21-62 and accompanying text.
184. Beagle, 492 P.2d at 7.
185. Id. at 4.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 13.
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id. at 4, 6, 9.
190. Id. at 9.
191. Id. at 7-9.
192. See discussion supra notes 21-62 and accompanying text.





198. See discussion supra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
20
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portant that a judge should exclude the evidence so the defendant
does not remain silent in fear of impeachment with prior convic-
tions. 199 The court made clear that every case varied and discretion
rested with the trial court in determining whether prior conviction evi-
dence should be excluded.
20
Following Beagle, cases continued to limit the use of prior convic-
tion evidence.20 ' In People v. Antick, the California Supreme Court
overturned convictions for theft, burglary, assault with a deadly
weapon and murder.20 2 The court found the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting prior conviction evidence against the defendant
for two forgery convictions that were seventeen and nineteen years
old. 0 3 The court noted that prior convictions provided "at best very
weak evidence" of the defendant witness' credibility.2 1° Writing for
the court, Justice Sullivan concluded that the potential for jury abuse
was great, especially in close factual situations.20 5
After Beagle and Antick, the California Supreme Court continued
to adhere to is holdings in those cases.20 6 Trial courts and intermedi-
ate appellate courts were reluctant in applying the rules and standards
articulated in Beagle.20 7 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
199. Beagle, 492 P.2d at 8.
200. Id. at 7.
201. See Hank M. Goldberg, The Impact of Proposition 8 on Prior Misconduct Impeachment
Evidence in California Criminal Cases, Lov. L.A. L. REV. 621, 623 n.16 (1991).
202. People v. Antick, 539 P.2d 43 (Cal. 1975).
203. Id. at 54-56.
204. Id. at 55.
205. Id. at 55-56.
206. See People v. Barrick, 654 P.2d 1243 (Cal. 1982) (holding defendant improperly im-
peached with evidence of prior conviction for same offense); People v. Spearman, 599 P.2d 74
(Cal. 1979) (holding defendant was improperly impeached with prior conviction evidence of nar-
cotics sale because selling narcotics does involve element of dishonesty or deceit); People v.
Fries, 594 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1979) (holding trial court erred in allowing impeachment with prior
conviction for same offense as that charged); People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1979) (hold-
ing trial court abused discretion in allowing impeachment with prior manslaughter and posses-
sion of a gun because those crimes do not involve dishonesty and showed violence but deceit and
attempts at mitigating prejudicial effect were inadequate); People v. Rist, 545 P.2d 833 (Cal.
1976) (holding trial court erred admitting prior convictions because convictions were too remote
to be sufficiently probative of truthfulness).
207. See People v. Rist, 545 P.2d 833, 840 (Cal. 1976). The court stated that "Beagle has not
been adhered to in a number of reported decisions." Id. The court went on to list several appel-
late decisions which it saw itself as overruling. Id. See also People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 774
(Cal. 1977). The court stated:
Twice in the past two years we have reviewed the origin and purpose of [the Beagle] rule,
provided elaborate guidance in its application, and reaffirmed its mandate by reversing
judgments of conviction on the ground that failure to exclude such evidence constituted a
prejudicial abuse of discretion in the circumstances of each case .... Surely we do not need
to repeat that discussion so soon. By now it should be clear to all that when a defendant
makes a timely objection to the introduction of evidence of a prior felony conviction for the
purpose of impeaching his testimony, the trial court is under a duty (1) to determine the
probative value of that evidence on the issue of the defendant's credibility as a witness, to
appraise the degree of prejudice which the defendant would suffer from admission of the
21
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continued to uphold its previous rulings and expanded on the doc-
trines expounded upon in Beagle and Antick.
In People v. Fries, the court ruled that it was reversible error for a
trial court to permit a prosecutor to impeach a defendant with prior
conviction evidence of the same or of a similar type of crime.2 0 8 Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Bird reasoned that the potential for
prejudice was acute since a jury would likely use the evidence to con-
clude that because the defendant committed the crime previously he
committed the same offense again. 0 9 The Chief Justice wrote again
for the California court in People v. Spearman.21 ° Joined by all but
two members of the court, Chief Justice Bird concluded that only felo-
nies which contain a necessary element with the intent to "deceive,
defraud, lie, cheat, steal .... " are admissible.2 11 Any other offenses
would merely show the defendant had a propensity for violence, law
breaking, etc., and such characteristics are not relevant to a jury in
weighing a witness' credibility.212
In 1982, California enacted Proposition Eight popularly known as
the "Victim's Bill of Rights. ' 213 This amendment to the California
Constitution makes "any prior felony conviction" admissible for im-
peachment "without limitation. '214 On its face the-amendment would
appear to have negated the importance of Beagle and the line of cases
which followed it.215 Despite the wording of the amendment, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court has held that a trial court still has discretion to
exclude prior conviction evidence when its prejudicial effect out-
weighs its probative value.2 16
In People v. Castro, the California court focused on § 28(d) of Prop-
osition Eight.2 1 7 Section 28(d) provides "Nothing in this section shall
evidence, and (3) to weigh the foregoing two factors against each other and exclude the
evidence "if its probative value (on the issue of credibility) is substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will... create substantial danger of undue prejudice."
Id. The court then went on to criticize the trial judge for failing to properly apply the correct
standard. Id.
208. People v. Fries, 594 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1979).
209. Id. at 23. In a later case, People v. Barrick, 654 P.2d 1243 (Cal. 1982), the court ex-
panded this ruling. Barrick involved a defendant charged with auto theft. The defendant had
prior convictions and the court held that admission of such evidence could not be "sanitized" by
a trial court's refusal to allow the prosecutor to go into details of the crime. Id.
210. People v. Spearman, 599 P.2d 74 (Cal. 1979).
211. Id. at 78.
212. Id. See also People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1979) (holding that the Beagle stan-
dard applied when deciding whether impeachment with a prior conviction was appropriate when
the witness was not the defendant).
213. See Goldberg, supra note 201, at 621.
214. CAL CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8).
215. See Goldberg, supra note 201, at 640.
216. People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 117 (Cal. 1985).
217. Id.
22
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affect any existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or
hearsay or Evidence code sections 352, 782, or 1103. "1218 From this
provision, the California court reasoned that voters had not intended
to deprive courts of the discretion to exclude prior conviction evi-
dence.219 The California court believed that to do so would present
due process problems. 220 However, the court failed to explain why
depriving courts of their discretion would violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause.21 In essence, the court affirmed the hold-
ing in Beagle. 2  The court argued that what voters intended when
they enacted Proposition Eight was to abolish the per se exclusion
rules developed in the line of post-Beagle cases.223
The Castro court also formulated a new test for admission of prior
conviction evidence.224 The court ruled that only prior convictions
which evidenced "moral turpitude" were admissible.225 Crimes which
evidence moral turpitude are those which show "a readiness to do
evil" by the defendant or show the defendant's "bad character.
'226
The California court noted that this included offenses of moral de-
pravity such as child abuse or molestation, torture and sometimes
crimes of violence.227 The court argued that although such offenses
may not show untruthfulness or deceit, a juror could conclude from
such offenses that a witness is "unworthy of credit" and should not be
believed.228
Proponents of Proposition Eight were disappointed with the Castro
decision. 229 Nevertheless, the passage of Proposition Eight greatly ex-
panded the use of prior conviction evidence for impeachment.23 ° To-
day, California courts have interpreted the California Constitution
and Castro to allow impeachment of criminal defendants with prior
convictions for assault and similar crimes,23' escape,232 child molesta-
218. CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8).
219. Castro, 696 P.2d at 117.
220. Id. at 118.
221. Id. The California Court's reference to constitutional problems is odd considering that
FRE 609 deprives the trial court of discretion in admitting prior convictions which involve dis-
honesty or deceit. Under FRE 609, such convictions are not subject to the normal balancing test
and a trial court has no discretion to exclude such prior conviction. Id.
222. Id. at 114-117.
223. Id. at 117.
224. Id. at 118.
225. Id. at 118-19.
226. Id. at 119.
227. Id. at 119-20 n. 10.
228. Id. at 119.
229. See Jeff Brown, Proposition 8 Origins and Impact - A Public Defender's Perspective, 23
PAc. L.J. 881, 903 (1992).
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., People v. Armendariz, 220 Cal. Rptr. 229, 232-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
232. See, e.g., People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 639-40 (Cal. 1989).
23
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tion,233 statutory rape2 34 and voluntary manslaughter.2 35 The Califor-
nia rule has also expanded the use of prior convictions for
impeachment over what is allowed under the FRE.
236
IV. THE ENGLISH APPROACH TO IMPEACHMENT WITH
PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Prior to 1898, a criminal defendant in England was considered in-
competent and could not testify on his or her own behalf.237 In 1898,
the Criminal Evidence Act was enacted giving criminal defendants the
right to testify.23 8 This Act specifically disallowed prosecutors from
impeaching criminal defendants by using prior convictions.239 In rele-
vant part, the Act provides:
A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any ques-
tion tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or
been charged with any offence [sic] other than that wherewith he is
then charged.24 °
In applying the rule, English courts have been rigid and have disal-
lowed any questions which would lead a reasonable juror to believe
that the defendant committed other offenses.241 Prosecutors may not
use a series of questions to elicit such information. z2 Nor may a pros-
ecutor ask questions tending to show the defendant spent time in jail
243or prison. If a prior conviction is disclosed, even accidentally, it is
grounds to discharge the jury.2'
Despite the strong policy objectives underlying the English rule on
impeachment through prior convictions, there are a number of impor-
tant exceptions. Most significantly, the English rules permit the de-
fendant to be impeached with evidence of prior convictions when he
or she puts his character in issue." 5 Prior conviction evidence may
only be used in attacking the witness's credibility and cannot be used
233. See, e.g., People v. Massey, 237 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
234. See, e.g., People v. Flutcher, 236 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
235. See, e.g., People v. Foster, 246 Cal. Rptr 855, 857-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
236. James R. Adams, Victims, Truth, and Detention - The People Spoke, 23 PAC. L.J. 973,
998 (1992).
237. M.N. HOWARD ET AL., PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE § 18-16 (14t ed. 1990).
238. Id.
239. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36 § 1.
240. Id. at § 1(f).




245. See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62, Vict., ch. 36 § 1(f)(ii). In relevant part the
provision provides that a criminal defendant may be asked about character if:
[H]e has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution
with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character,
24
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for any improper purpose.246 In effect, the rule's exception still af-
fords a criminal defendant protection so long as he or she does not
actively attempt to mislead the jury into believing that he or she has a
spotless record. z47 In addition, the defendant cannot attempt to bol-
ster his or her own testimony by introducing prior conviction evidence
against a state witness. If a defendant decides to attack the state's
witness with prior conviction evidence, the English rule permits the
prosecutor to impeach the defendant with prior conviction
evidence.248
There are other exceptions to the English rule. Evidence of prior
convictions may also be used to prove a similar fact.2 49 For example in
Jones v. Dir. Public Prosecutions, the defendant was accused of raping
and killing a girl.250 About three months prior to the murder trial, he
had been convicted of raping and assaulting a different girl.251' Evi-
dence from the first trial showed that the rape was committed in an
almost identical fashion to the rape at issue in the second trial.252 The
trial court allowed the prosecutor to use evidence from the first trial in
the second trial.253 The House of Lords sustained the conviction on
the ground that the prior conviction evidence was not introduced to
show the defendant's propensity to rape, but was offered to show simi-
lar facts.254
Prior conviction evidence is also admissible to prove part of a subse-
quent offense.255 For example, evidence that a defendant was con-
victed of burglary would be admissible in a subsequent trial for
loitering with the intent to commit a felony.256 Finally, prior convic-
tion evidence is admissible when a criminal penalty is enhanced for
prior convictions.257 Similar rules exist in the United States allowing
prosecutors to use prior conviction evidence to prove motive, oppor-
or the nature or conduct of the defence [sic] is such as to involve imputations of the charac-
ter of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. Id.
246. See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 237, at § 18-16.
247. See G.D. NOKES, AN INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE, 138, 141 (4't ed. 1967).
248. Id. at 139.
249. Id. at 18-25.
250. Jones v. Dir. Public Prosecutions, 1962 App. Cas. 635, 635-641 (appeal taken from
Eng.).
251. Id. at 636-641.
252. Id. at 640-41. The House of Lords did not explain exactly how the two crimes were
similar. It stated "There were significant similarities between the two cases which it is unneces-
sary to set out in detail. It is sufficient to say that in the opinion of the court they were such as
would have rendered admissible." Id.
253. Id. at 636-38.
254. Id. at 636-39.
255. Id. at 639.
256. Id.
257. See generally HOWARD ET AL., supra note 237, at §§ 18-16 - 18-58 (referring generally
to the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 § l(f), supra note 239).
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tunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.258
The rationale and policy behind the English rule is clear from vari-
ous statutory provisions and case law. English courts applying the
rule have noted such evidence should not be allowed because a jury
might be misled into thinking the defendant has a propensity to com-
mit crimes, and therefore must have committed the crime with which
he or she is charged.2" 9
In The King v. Ellis, the defendant was on trial for fraud.26 ° He had
prior convictions for fraud and had also been held liable in civil
court.2 6 1 During cross-examination the prosecutor elicited informa-
tion concerning these prior acts.262 Defense counsel objected, but by
the time the objection was made the jury had already heard inadmissi-
ble evidence. 263 The trial court did not discharge the jury which even-
tually convicted the defendant for fraud.264 On review in the Court of
Criminal Appeals, the court noted that there was sufficient evidence
which would support the jury's verdict.265 The court, nevertheless,
quashed the conviction.2 66 The court'ruled that the prejudicial effect
of the inadmissible evidence was so great the defendant was not in-
sured a fair trial.2 67 While the trial judge admonished the jury not to
consider the evidence, the appeals court concluded that the prejudicial
effect of the evidence could not be overcome with this instruction.268
As the appeals court stated "We feel bound, therefore, to say not only
that the jury may have been influenced but that they must have been
influenced. 
269
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.2 7 ° In The King v.
Butterwasse, the King's Bench quashed a conviction because prior
conviction evidence was used to impeach the defendant. 271 The court
held that the prejudicial nature of the evidence mandated a new
258. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
259. See Maxwell v. Dir. Public Prosecutions, 1935 App. Cas. 309, 321 (appeal taken from
Eng.). The court stated "[Tihe questions whether a man has been convicted...ought not to be
admitted, if there is any risk of the jury being misled into thinking that it goes not to credibility,
but to the probability of his having committed the offense with which he is charged." Id.
260. The King v. Ellis, 2 K.B. 746, 748 (1910).
261. Id. at 749-750.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 763.
264. Id. at 751.
265. Id. at 751-52.
266. Id. at 765.
267. Id. at 764-65.
268. Id. at 764-65.
269. Id. at 765.
270. See The King v. Butterwasse, 1 K.B. 4 (1947).
271. Id. at 6.
26
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trial.27z The court believed that given the prejudicial nature of the
evidence, it was impossible to determine if the jury would reach the
same verdict absent the prior conviction evidence.273
Most courts in England have not gone so far as to articulate a per se
rule reversing convictions when prior conviction evidence is admit-
ted.274 Generally, the defendant must show that the entire cross-ex-
amination was prejudicial in nature or was tainted by the questions
concerning prior conviction evidence.275 However, the plain language
of the Criminal Evidence Act and judicial recognition of the prejudi-
cial effect of prior convictions have eliminated impeachment by prior
conviction evidence in England.
V. UNDERMINING THE AsSUMPTIONs BEHIND RULE 609
The American rule, adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, permits
the use of prior conviction evidence to impeach a criminal defendant.
The rule is based on unfounded assumptions which have no factual
basis for support.27 6 Drafters of the rule assumed that jurors are capa-
ble of understanding a judge's limiting instruction.277 In addition, the
drafters assumed that jurors will actually obey the instruction.278 Nu-
merous studies conducted over the last forty years have shown that
these assumptions are unfounded fictions and are simply wrong. Ju-
rors do use prior conviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and
jurors frequently ignore or fail to understand limiting instructions.
Moreover, even if jurors understood and attempted to follow a judge's
limiting instruction, it is not clear that even the most levelheaded juror
would be able to completely eliminate the prejudicial effect of hearing
such evidence.
One of the first relevant studies was conducted at the University of
Chicago.27 9 The subjects were people called to jury duty.28° They
were asked to listen to a tape of a civil trial involving an automobile
accident in order to determine damages.28' One group was told that
the defendant, who was clearly liable, was covered by insurance.282
Half of this group was then instructed to ignore this fact in determin-
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See HOWARD ET AL., supra note 237, at § 18-16.
275. Id.
276. See Ordover, supra note 177, at 173-187.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 753-
754 (1959).
280. Id. at 753.
281. Id. at 753-54.
282. Id.
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ing damages. 283 The other group was asked to determine damages
without having any knowledge of the insurance policy. 2 4 The results
of the study are revealing.285 The group which did not have any
knowledge of the insurance policy, returned an average award of
$33,000.286 The group that knew of the policy, but was not instructed
to ignore the policy in determining damages, returned an average
award of $37,000.287 Surprisingly, the group which knew of the policy,
and was instructed to ignore it, awarded damages of $46,000 on aver-
age.288 Contrary to the underlying assumptions of the American rule,
the University of Chicago's study was one of the first indications that
jurors may not readily comprehend limiting instructions. Even when
such instructions are understood, the jury may ignore them.289
In 1966, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel published an influential
book on jury behavior.290 The authors undertook a number of studies
in which they observed how jurors reacted to types of evidence, trial
techniques, etc. 291 The book was subject to varying and contradictory
interpretations by the Supreme Court. In Spencer v. Texas, the Court
held that a Texas statute which allowed prior conviction evidence to
be used to enhance a sentence, was constitutional when the jury was
• given notice of the prior conviction before determining guilt or inno-
cence on the facts being tried.2 92 The majority cited Kalven and
Zeisel for support of the proposition that jurors were likely to obey a
judge's limiting instruction.2 9 3 The Court's reliance on this study is
odd. Conviction rates were actually much higher when a defendant's








290. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AmERICAN JURY (1966).
291. Id.
292. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
293. See id. at 565 n.8. The majority footnote provided:
Indeed the most recent scholarly study of jury behavior does not sustain the premise that
juries are especially prone to prejudice when prior-crime evidence is admitted as to credibil-
ity. Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury (1966). The study contrasts the effect of such
evidence on judges and juries and concludes that "Neither the one nor the other can be said
to be distinctively gullible or skeptical."
Id. (citing KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 290, at 180).
294. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 290, at 179. Extrapolating the data in table 56 shows
that juries convicted roughly 64% of the time when the defendant had no record and took the
stand. When the jury knew of the defendant's criminal record and the defendant did not take
the stand the conviction rate was only 41%. Id. See also Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks,
On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide
Guilt, 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37 (1985). The authors state that conviction rates were 27% higher
when jurors knew of prior conviction evidence. Id. at 38.
28
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odd and cited the same pages for its proposition that jurors ignore a
judge's limiting instruction.2 95 Following the decision the authors
noted in a second edition that the dissent's interpretation of the data
was correct.2 96 The authors' study did in fact suggest that limiting in-
structions were ignored.
Following the second edition of The American Jury in 1971, re-
searchers in Canada studied the effect of prior conviction evidence in
criminal cases.2 97  Like the American rule, the Canadian evidence
rule, in effect, allowed prosecutors to impeach a criminal defendant
with prior conviction evidence.298 The researchers studied forty-eight
people who were divided into four groups. 299 Each of the groups read
evidence about a defendant who was accused of breaking and enter-
ing. One group was instructed to give a verdict without any knowl-
edge about the defendant's prior record. 30 1 The second group was
told the defendant did not testify because he had nothing to add to his
defense. 30 2 The third group was told that the defendant had five con-
victions for armed robbery.30 3 The fourth group was told the defend-
ant took the stand but had nothing important to add to his defense. °4
Additionally, this group was informed of the five convictions but was
given a standard limiting instruction.30 5 Since the defendant had noth-
ing to add to the case the prior convictions should have had no effect
on the jurors. However, that was not the case.30 6 The last two groups
indicated much stronger tendencies to convict than the first two
groups.30 7 Based on these results, the researchers concluded that prior
conviction evidence was used in ways impermissible under Canadian
evidence rules and that a judge's limiting instruction would not change
this fact.
30 8
295. Spencer, 385 U.S. at 575 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
296. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY Vi ( 2 nd ed. 1971). In
the preface to the second edition the authors stated "We note with mixed reaction that The
American Jury has thus joined that distinctive group of books that can be quoted on both sides
of the issue. In this particular instance we would say that Justice Warren, who cites the technical
passages, not just a sentence, had us right. Id.
297. See A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect ofs. 12 of











308. Id. at 93-96. The researchers wrote "It is clear that the presence of the criminal record
had a dramatic effect while none of the other instructions had a significant effect." Id. at 93. The
researchers also noted that the limiting instruction had no effect on results. "The 'judge's in-
29
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These results were supported the following year by another study
which showed the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence at a
criminal trial.3 °9 In the experiment, mock jurors read evidence of a
robbery and murder.310 In addition to the evidence in the cases, two
groups of jurors heard a tape recording of the defendant.311 In the
recording, the defendant told his bookmaker that he finally had the
money to pay him and that he could read about it in the paper.312 One
group who heard the tape recording were given a limiting instruction
to ignore the evidence.31 3 If the limiting instruction had the effect the
drafters of the FRE and state evidence codes assumed, one would ex-
pect that the conviction rates would be relatively equal between the
two groups.3 14 When the evidence against the defendant was strong,
the jurors did not rely on the tape recording and conviction rates were
roughly equal.315 However, when the evidence against the defendant
was weak, there was a thirty-five percent difference in conviction rates
between the two groups.3 16 The study implies that in close factual
cases, inadmissible evidence or evidence used improperly by a jury
may tilt the scales in favor of conviction when the jury would other-
wise acquit. Thus, the potential for prejudice is greatest in close cases.
One criticism lodged against such studies is that the higher convic-
tion rates are the result of jurors using the evidence to determine that
the defendant's credibility is weak.317 Accordingly, jurors tend not to
believe the defendant who undermines his own defense.318 In 1975,
another study was published answering this criticism and further un-
dermining the assumptions behind Rule 609.319 Each subject read a
structions' had no effect whatsoever on the decisions by the subjects." Id. at 95. The researchers
concluded:
In conclusion it seems to us, as psychologists looking at s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence
Act, that on the basis of psychological knowledge and empirical data this section strongly
works against the accused person even when the jury is instructed (or when the judge "in-
structs himself") to disregard the previous convictions when determining guilt or innocence.
Id. at 96.
309. See Stanley Sue, Robert Smith & Cathy Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on
the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3-4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 347, 347-354
(1973)(finding that in simulation, when there is little evidence on which to base a decision, jurors
often use evidence the judge instructs them to disregard).




314. Id. at 350.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See Ordover, supra note 177 at 176.
318. Id.
319. Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and Delib-
erations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235 (1975-76). This experiment was designed to as-
sess the effects of a defendant's criminal record on both individual and group verdicts of his guilt.
30
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description of hypothetical care about a man accused of burglary.32 °
Half of the subjects were told that the accused had been previously
convicted of burglary. 321 They were also given an instruction that the
prior record should be used only to determine the defendant's credi-
bility and not to determine the defendant's guilt or innocence.322
The juries which had the prior record information were significantly
more likely to convict the defendant than juries without the informa-
tion.323 Forty percent of the guilty verdicts were given by groups that
had prior record information, while the groups that did not have the
prior record information did not return any guilty verdicts.324 The
presence of a prior record did not seem to make much difference in
the percentage of guilty verdicts when the verdicts were given individ-
ually.325 According to the researchers, in the group verdict situation
there is more time for the defendant's prior record to "sink-in" during
deliberations and possibly affect the group verdict.326 Thus, the pres-
ence of prior records "appear to reliably increase the probability that
a defendant will be found guilty by a jury, regardless of the
evidence. 
327
The researchers also discovered that those groups with the prior
record information were significantly more likely to state that the evi-
dence against the defendant was strong.328 These groups also stated
that the evidence tended to bring up more frequently those facts that
were most damaging to the defendant. 329 However, there were many
distortions of fact made by the jurors in the course of deliberations.33 °
Forty-one percent of the distortions of fact were corrected by other
group members.33' It is notable that the groups with prior record in-
formation were somewhat more likely to correct such distortions than
the groups without the prior record information.332 According to the
researchers, this may imply that those jurors who had prior record
information were "alerted to the possible biases they themselves or
There were twenty persons in the individual verdict conditions and fifteen groups of four persons
in each of the group verdict conditions. Id. at 238-39.
320. Id. at 239.
321. Id. at 240.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 242.
324. Id. at 243 (from the table).
325. Id. at 242. Forty-five percent of the guilty verdicts were given by individuals who had
the prior record information, while forty percent of the guilty verdicts were given by individuals
who did not have the prior record information. Id. at 243.
326. Id. at 243.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 244.
329. Id.
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other group members have had towards distorting the case because of
the defendant's record." '3 33 However, there is no direct evidence to
support this interpretation.334
In 1983, a study was conducted to determine the effects of inadmis-
sible evidence on jurors.335 The subjects in this study read a descrip-
tion of an armed robbery of a grocery store that resulted in the deaths
of two individuals.336 All of the subjects received trial summaries of
the case, but the researchers varied the strength of the prosecution's
case against the defendant by manipulating the specific contents of the
summaries.3 3 7 The researchers also gave some groups wiretapping ev-
idence, introduced by the prosecution, in which the defendant bragged
to a bookmaker that he had recently acquired some money in a dan-
gerous way.33 8 Other groups received wiretapping evidence, intro-
duced by the defense, in which the grocery store clerk who witnessed
the robbery bragged to the bookmaker that he recently acquired
money in a dangerous way.3 39 The wiretapping evidence was ruled
admissible or inadmissible by the judge; an inadmissible ruling was
based on the notion that such evidence would only be used against the
bookmaker and not against any of his clients.3 4 °
The researchers found that the subjects that received inadmissible
wiretapping evidence, introduced by the prosecution, almost always
had more negative reactions toward the defendant than did the con-
trol subjects.3 4 ' Subjects that received inadmissible evidence, intro-
duced by the defense, also tended to have more positive reactions
towards the defendant than the control subjects.3 4 2 These results sug-
gest that the subjects "made at least some use of inadmissible evi-
dence in deciding whether inadmissible the defendant was guilty or
innocent. 3 43 The subjects who had received inadmissible wiretapping
evidence spoke about it openly during group deliberations, particu-
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See Thomas R. Carretta & Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of
Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291 (1983); see also Sharon Wolf and David
A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disre-
gard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205 (1977) (supporting the
claim that jurors do not obey limiting instructions).
336. See Carretta & Moreland, supra note 335, at 294.
337. Id. at 295. Subjects were thus presented with either a weak, moderate, or strong case
against the defendant.
338. Id.
339. Id. There was a control group which did not receive any wiretapping information.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 305.
342. Id. The subjects reactions were not as strong as they would have been had such evi-
dence been ruled admissible.
343. Id.
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larly when such 'evidence favored the prosecution.344 However, when-
ever a group member mentioned such evidence, another member
would often remind the group about the judge's ruling regarding the
evidence's inadmissibility. 345 This monitoring of group discussions
was less common when the inadmissible evidence favored the prose-
cution rather than the defense.346
A 1985 study also revealed the inefficacy of limiting instructions.347
Subjects were given descriptions of two hypothetical cases, one involv-
ing auto theft and one involving murder.348 The cases were designed
in such a way that the defendant's guilt or innocence was ambigu-
ous.349 One of the following four variations of prior record convic-
tions accompanied each case: no prior convictions, previous
conviction for the same crime, previous conviction for a different
crime, or previous conviction for perjury.35 ° The latter three condi-
tions were also accompanied by instructions by the judge that the sub-
jects were not to consider evidence of the defendant's prior record as
indicative of his criminal tendencies or disposition, but to use this evi-
dence solely to assess his credibility.35'
The researchers found that the defendant's credibility was not sig-
nificantly higher when there were no prior convictions nor signifi-
cantly lower with a prior perjury conviction, thus indicating that the
evidence of prior convictions did not affect ratings of the defendant's
credibility.352 However, when looking at conviction rates, defendants
with no prior convictions had a significantly lower conviction rate than
defendants with any type of prior conviction.353 Defendants convicted
of the same crime had a significantly higher conviction rate than those
convicted of a different crime or perjury.354 Finally, fifty-six percent
of the subjects felt that prior conviction evidence increased the likeli-
hood that the defendant was guilty, while thirty-eight percent stated
that it did not influence the likelihood of the defendant's guilt.
355
344. Id. at 306.
345. Id. at 306-07. Overall, this phenomenon occurred about fifty-six percent of the time
among groups that received inadmissible wiretapping evidence. Id. at 307. When such evidence
favored the prosecution, it occurred forty-nine percent of the time and when the evidence fa-
vored the defense, it occurred eighty-three percent. Id.
346. Id. at 307.
347. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 294, at 37.




352. Id. at 41.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 41-42.
355. Id. at 42.
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According to the rationale behind FRE Rule 609, a defendant's
criminal record is admitted into evidence for the limited purpose of
impeaching his credibility and should thus "influence verdicts only to
the extent that it decreases the believability of the defendant's testi-
mony. '356 The subjects in this study, however, did not appear to use
evidence of prior convictions to assess the defendant's credibility.
357
It appears that subjects used the prior conviction evidence to gauge
the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime charged.358 It
is notable that the subjects admitted that such evidence increased the
likelihood that the defendant's guilt and was the reason they found
him guilty, even though they had been instructed not to use the evi-
dence for that purpose.359 In conclusion, the researcher stated that:
The presentation of the defendant's criminal record does not affect the
defendant's credibility, but does increase the likelihood of conviction,
and the judge's limiting instructions do not appear to correct that er-
ror. People's decision processes do not employ the prior-conviction
evidence in the way the law wishes them to use it.
3 6 0
A 1988 study that examined the effects of impeachment evidence in
civil cases revealed that such evidence produced permissible as well as
impermissible influences. 361 Subjects in this study were divided into
three groups.36 2 One group was told that the defendant had no prior
convictions.363 Another group was told that the defendant was previ-
ously convicted of perjury and the last group was told that the defend-
ant was previously convicted of perjury, but was given a limiting
instruction that such evidence was to be used solely for the purpose of
judging the defendant's credibility, not liability.36
The researchers found that the perjury convictions lowered the de-
fendant's perceived credibility as well as increased the defendant's
propensity towards harm and future negligence. 365 If the limiting in-
struction had worked as intended, they should have restricted infer-
ences to the issue of the defendant's credibility.366 Instead, any
356. Id. at 43.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 44.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 47. See also David Landy & Elliot Aronson, The influence of the Character of the
Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 141 (1969) (researchers confirmed that the more "attractive" a defendant the more
likely jurors were to acquit). Thus, an unattractive defendant with prior convictions is less likely
to be acquitted. Id.
361. Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and Limiting In-
structions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 477 (1988).
362. Id. at 482.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 494.
366. Id.
34
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 [1997], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol23/iss1/4
48 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:14
information regarding a prior perjury conviction produced higher pro-
pensity ratings both with and without a limiting instruction.
367
A 1995 study conducted by researchers Edith Greene and Mary
Dodge examined the impact of prior acquittal evidence as well as
prior conviction evidence on juror decision making.3 68 Six versions of
an armed robbery transcript were produced in which the type of evi-
dence (prior acquittal, prior conviction, or no information about a
prior record) and the presence or absence of limiting instructions were
manipulated.3 69 Researchers found that the subjects who heard evi-
dence of prior acquittal were no more likely to convict the defendant
than those who had no information about a prior record.3 70 Those
who learned that the defendant had been previously convicted were
significantly more likely to convict him than subjects without this in-
formation.371 The use of limiting instruction had little effect on the
subjects' use of prior record evidence.372 This can be seen for the ver-
dicts returned from these groups which were no different than those
verdicts returned from the groups which did not have such
instructions.373
These results were confirmed the same year in a study which used
several experiments to determine if jurors could follow instructions to
disregard prior conviction evidence and hearsay.374 In one experi-
ment jurors heard evidence of prior convictions but were admonished
to ignore this evidence.375 A second group heard the same evidence,
was admonished to ignore the evidence and was given a legal explana-
tion as to why the information should be ignored.37 6 These two groups
showed higher conviction rates than a third group which was not given
any information regarding prior conviction evidence.3 7 7 In fact, the
second group had the highest conviction rate among the three
groups.3 78 In a second experiment, mock jurors heard hearsay evi-
dence and were instructed to disregard that evidence.379 A second
group heard the same evidence, was told to ignore it and was told the
367. Id.
368. Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Deci-
sion Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1995).
369. Id at 71.




374. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence Legal Explanation
Does Not Help, 19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 407 (1995).
375. Id. at 411-13.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 411-15.
378. Id. at 415.
379. Id. at 415-17.
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reasons why the hearsay should be ignored.38° A third group heard
the same evidence, but not the hearsay. 381 The three groups had simi-
lar convictions rates and the differences were not statistically signifi-
cant.382 The fact that jurors were able to ignore hearsay evidence but
not prior conviction evidence indicates the prejudicial effect of prior
conviction evidence even when it has no bearing on the defendant's
credibility as a witness.
Indeed, it is readily accepted by psychologists and social scientists
that prior conviction evidence is misused by jurors who do not under-
stand the Rules of Evidence.383 It has been argued that the Rules of
Evidence which permit prior convictions to be presented, particularly
Rule 609, should be re-examined.384 Such pleas have fallen on deaf
ears largely because the research showing the prejudicial effect of
prior conviction evidence has been published outside of law reviews,
law journals and other traditional legal forums. Unfortunately for
criminal defendants and the American justice system, scientific data
showing how prior conviction evidence is misused by jurors has gone
unnoticed by lawyers, judges, and courts.
However, the conclusion these scientists have reached simply con-
firm what lawyers, judges, and courts have known all along: jurors will
use evidence of prior convictions for impermissible purposes and a
judge's limiting instruction will have little or no effect on jurors. As
Justice Jackson stated, "[tihe naive assumption that prejudicial effects
can be overcome by instructions to the jury... all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction." '385 Justice Jackson's statement is sup-
ported by a survey in which 98% of lawyers believed that jurors were
not able to follow instructions to consider prior conviction evidence
only for impeachment purposes.38 6 Indeed, it is widely recognized and
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 417-20.
383. See, e.g., Green & Dodge, supra note 368, at 69 ("Given the number of studies that
show that jurors are clearly influenced by evidence of previous convictions ...."); Edmund S.
Howe, Judged Likelihood of Different Second Crimes Function of Judged Similarity, 21 J. AP-
PLIED SOC. PsYcHoL. 697 (1991) (finding numerous studies have concluded that the judged
probability of conviction for a crime is higher when information concerning a prior conviction is
disclosed).
384. See Tanford & Cox, supra note 361, at 496. The authors wrote:
Given the fact that the evidence [of prior convictions] does have harmful effects that current
legal safeguards do not eliminate, one suggestion to legal policy makers would be to estab-
lish stricter guidelines for admitting impeachment evidence. . . .Based on our current
knowledge, it appears that it may be more effective to prevent the harmful effects of im-
peachment and other character- related evidence from occurring in the first place, by limit-
ing the admissibility of the evidence itself, rather than asking jurors to limit its use.
Id.
385. Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
386. See Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROaS. 215, 218 (1968).
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accepted among criminal defense attorneys that putting a criminal de-
fendant on the stand who has prior convictions is a risky move.387
Even conservative judges have taken notice that jurors will use evi-
dence, of prior convictions to draw impermissible inferences. More-
over, a judge's limiting instruction is not likely to have any effect.
Judge Easterbrook noted that telling jurors to consider prior convic-
tions only to weigh the defendant's credibility is like telling jurors to
ignore a hippopotamus.388 Likewise, Learned Hand wrote that asking
jurors to follow a limiting instruction was "a mental gymnastic which
is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's.
389
In short, jurors draw impermissible inferences from prior conviction
evidence. When jurors hear that the defendant has committed some
crime in the past, particularly the same crime, they conclude that the
defendant must have committed the crime with which he is currently
charged. A judge's limiting instruction is of little help to the criminal
defendant, since jurors typically do not understand the limiting in-
struction or choose to ignore it. The instruction may damage the de-
fendant's case because the jurors may resent the instruction. Even
jurors who attempt to faithfully adhere to a judge's limiting instruc-
tion are likely to view the defendant with contempt because of prior
conviction evidence. The fact that prior conviction evidence is highly
prejudicial can no longer be ignored.
VI. WHAT'S WRONG WITH ALLOWING PRIOR CONVICTION
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES?
There is little doubt that the admission of prior conviction evidence
makes both the prosecutor's and jurors' jobs easier. That is exactly the
problem with admitting such evidence.
Prior conviction evidence gives prosecutors an extra advantage and
jurors extra evidence to convict when jurors may otherwise find rea-
387. See Fontham, supra note 11, at § 7-27.
388. U.S. v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 264 (7' Cir. 1986). Judge Easterbrook wrote:
The "bad character" inference is inseparable from the "bad intent" inference. We do not
pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind without thinking about the other. An
instruction told the jury to do this, but this is like telling someone not to think about a
hippopotamus. To tell someone not to think about the beast is to assure at least a fleeting
mental image. So it is here. Each juror must have had both the legitimate and the forbid-
den considerations somewhere in Mind, if only in the subconscious.
Id. at 264-65.
389. Nash v. U.S., 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). Judge Hand expressed similar concerns
in other cases. In U.S. v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1948), he stated "Nobody can
indeed fail to doubt whether the caution is effective, or whether usually the practical result is not
to let in hearsay." See also U.S. v. Delli Paoli, 2219 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (continuing to
voice the same concerns for jurors, Judge Hand noted "[i]t is indeed very hard to believe that a
jury will, or for that matter can, in practice observe the admonition .... [R]elatively few persons
have any such power, involving as it does a violence to all our habitual ways of thinking.").
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sonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime with which he
or she is charged. This problem is only exacerbated when the case is
close.3 9° In this way, the current American rule denies the criminal
defendant all the rights to which he or she is entitled.
Our criminal justice system sacrifices accuracy in order to afford
protection to criminal defendants. 391 Few people have openly criti-
cized the statement that "it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free. '392 While our system is concerned
with jurors reaching the truth, the courts in this country are recogniz-
ing that truth and a juror's fact-finding abilities may need to be sacri-
ficed in order to protect other core values. Our system excludes all
kinds of evidence which may help a jury to discover the truth, such as:
privileged communications, hearsay exclusions, and exclusions be-
cause evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution.393
The current version of Rule 609 sacrifices individual rights and
turns traditional notions of American criminal law on its head. The
goal has been to increase convictions and get criminals off the street,
but what has been forgotten are the underlying social goals and poli-
cies behind American criminal law. It has long been recognized that a
person should not suffer criminal sanctions because he is a bad person
or has done bad things in the past. Criminal justice in this country is
premised on the assumption of punishing only specific acts which the
state can prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proponents of Rule 609 and similar state rules have been careful to
cloak their true intentions in the rhetoric of either "victim's rights,
394
or "not allowing criminals to escape justice."3 95 The true intention is
clear: get convictions and get criminals off the street. Based on Cali-
fornia's enactment of Proposition 8 (which had a far greater impact on
criminal law than the evidence rules discussed in this article), it is
questionable whether the rule had the intended effect.396 Studies of
California's crime rates indicate that crime in California is as bad as it
was before Proposition 8 was passed.3 97 Nevertheless, the rule is still
390. See discussion supra notes 279-389 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., President's Commission On Law Enforcement and the Administration of Jus-
tice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967). In relevant part, the report stated "[olur
system of justice deliberately sacrifices much in efficiency and even in effectiveness in order to
preserve local autonomy and to protect the individual .... " Id.
392. In re Samuel Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
393. 2 SIMON H. RIFKIND, THE LAWYER'S ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN SOCIETY
515, 527-528 (Adam Bellow & William Keens eds., 1986).
394. See discussion supra notes 103-176 and accompanying text.
395. 120 CONG. REC. 37076 (1974) (comment by Sen. McClellan).
396. See Brown, supra note 229, at 973.
397. Id.
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on the books and proponents of the rule probably still believe that it
has done some good on the "war against crime."
In this regard, Senator Hruska's supporting remarks of conviction
evidence are revealing. In the Senate debate, he explained his motive
by giving an example:
Suppose a defendant being tried for loansharking has previously been
convicted of several other charges of loansharking. And suppose he
gets on the stand and says that he was not loansharking this particular
time. Should not the jury know that the defendant has previously
been convicted of loansharking several other times ....
Senator Hruska's comments reveal that he not only misunderstands
the stated purpose behind Rule 609, but he would also have the rule
be used to show that the criminal defendant has a propensity to com-
mit crime.39 9 This interpretation is clearly not the way the drafters of
the FRE and similar state rules intended that prior conviction evi-
dence be used.4" The Senator's comments aside, one must realize
that is exactly how jurors use the evidence. When jurors hear that a
defendant did a particular act before, they conclude he or she must
have done that same act again. If jurors hear that the defendant has a
criminal record, they conclude that if he or she broke one law he or
she would have no problem breaking the law again. Criminal defense
attorneys, thus, have been reluctant to put their clients on the stand.4°'
A criminal defendant who does not take the stand suffers in at least
two important ways. First, the defendant does not participate fully in
his or her own defense. It has long been recognized that criminal de-
fendants have the right to participate in their trial and testify in their
own defense. 4°o However, these rights mean little if the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence severely deter participation because of unfair
prejudice.
Proponents of Rule 609 and similar state evidence rules have de-
fended Rule 609 on the ground that jurors need the information in
order to weigh the credibility of the defendant.40 3 Without such infor-
mation, jurors would believe that the defendant is just as credible as
398. 120 CONG. REC. 37077 (1974) (remarks of Mr. Hruska).
399. Id.
400. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). In relevant part, the rule provides "Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." Id.
401. See Fontham, supra note 11, at § 7-27.
402. See discussion supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
403. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 37077 (1974). Senator Hruska stated:
Mr. President I am a firm believer in the jury system. I am of the conviction that the triers
of fact have a need for all the relevant evidence that will assist them in judging the credibility
of a witness. One of these pieces of evidence is the fact that the defendant has been con-
victed of prior felonies.
Id. at 37077 (emphasis added). Senator McClellan stated:
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the next witness because it would appear to them that he or she had
led a blameless life.4°4 The thrust of this argument is that the jury
should be given as much information as possible to determine the
credibility of the defendant and arrive at the truth in the matter. Pro-
ponents point out that rules of evidence ought to increase the amount
of relevant information a jury hears.
Ironically, Rule 609 has had the opposite effect. Instead of increas-
ing the amount of relevant information jurors have, Rule 609 has de-
creased what jurors hear. The fear of being impeached with prior
conviction evidence has led many criminal defendants to remain silent
and not take the stand. In these cases jurors have been deprived of
hearing the defendant testify. No one knows better than the defend-
ant if he or she committed the crime with which he or she is charged.
Thus, a jury ought to hear this testimony. However, given the harsh
reality of Rule 609, many defendants have remained silent, thus possi-
bly depriving the jury of the most critical piece of testimony available
to them.
Second, a jury is likely to draw a negative inference from the fact
the defendant did not testify." 5 This is particularly troubling in the
majority of criminal cases where the defense is simply one that asserts
that the defendant did not do it. Jurors are likely to wonder why a
defendant who is innocent did not take the stand and testify to his or
her innocence.
With the inherent problems of allowing impeachment of a criminal
defendant who has prior conviction evidence, it has been argued that
impeachment should be limited to crimes involving dishonesty or de-
ceit. Representative Dennis argued for such a rule when the Federal
Rules of Evidence were drafted.4°  A handful of states have also
adopted this approach.40 7 The argument in support of such a rule is
that crimes such as perjury and embezzlement are inherently deceitful
and directly relevant to a defendant's credibility. This argument has
some initial plausibility. If a defendant witness perjured himself in a
prior case, that fact would certainly give a jury an important piece of
information it might use in weighing his credibility.
If the jury is to be permitted to correctly determine what the true facts are in a particular
case, it must be permitted to have all the evidence before it that will enable it to judge the
credibility of witnesses who have given testimony on the material facts reflecting guilt or
innocence. The jury must be able to correctly choose who is to be believed. To make that
determination they should have access to all available information that bears on the credi-
bility of witnesses who testify ....
Id. at 37076.
404. Id.
405. See Fontham, supra note 11, at § 7-27.
406. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 2377 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis).
407. See ARK. REV. R. 609; MICH REv. R. EVID. 609; W. VA. REV. R. EvID. 609.
40
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However, such an approach to prior conviction evidence is prob-
lematic. First, it is difficult to define exactly what crimes involve dis-
honesty and deceit.40 8 Some states have attempted to solve this
problem by specifically listing the crimes which may be used to im-
peach a criminal defendant. 409 Listing crimes may be useful to trial
court judges, but it does not fully solve the problem. On the floor of
the House, Representative Hogan explained the problem.410 He ar-
gued that theft might ordinarily be considered deceptive and deceitful
such that prior convictions for theft would be admissible to prove un-
truthfulness. Then he argued that all thefts were not necessarily de-
ceitful.411 For example, a college student who stole a car to go "joy
riding" as part of a fraternity initiation was hardly being dishonest,
deceptive or deceitful. One can think of many similar examples. The
point is that whether a crime is deceptive, deceitful, or shows untruth-
fulness, depends to a large extent on the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the commission of the crime. Simply listing crimes which
are deceitful and deceptive fails to account for all the circumstances
surrounding the crimes.
A rule allowing impeachment of a criminal defendant with prior
conviction evidence is also problematic because of the assumptions
underlying such a rule. Proponents of such a rule assume that crimes
involving dishonesty or deceit (whatever crimes those may be) are the
only crimes relevant to proving truthfulness.412 Certainly, crimes in-
volving dishonesty do bear on the credibility of a witness, but it is not
necessary to stop there. One could argue that breaking any law re-
flects on truthfulness. If a witness is willing to break a law, then one
could argue that the witness would certainly have no problem being
untruthful in court. It is not necessary to draw such conclusions, but it
is not unreasonable to conclude that one who breaks the law would
also lie in open court. The point is simply that other crimes may well
bear on a defendant's truthfulness irrespective of the nature of the
crime.
Regardless of which crimes bear on a defendant's credibility, the
real problem with allowing impeachment with prior conviction evi-
dence is the unfair prejudice which results. Proponents of Rule 609
have argued that any prejudicial effect created when jurors hear such
evidence can be cured, or at least mitigated, by a judge's limiting in-
struction.413 This is simply not true.4 14 Jurors do not understand limit-
408. See 120 CONG. REC. 2376 (1974) (remarks by Rep. Hogan).
409. See IND. REV. R. EVID. 609; MICH. REV. R. EVID. 609.
410. See supra note 408.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 2377 (remarks by Rep. Dennis).
413. See supra note 398. Senator Hruska stated:
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ing instructions in the civil or criminal context.4 15 The results are
particularly troubling in the criminal context. When the jury hears
that the defendant broke the law before, they conclude he or she must
have broken the law again. The presumption of innocence is reversed
and a criminal defendant is left with little chance of acquittal, even
when the evidence against him or her may be fairly weak. Of course,
it is in close cases that the jury is especially likely to misuse the prior
conviction evidence and convict the defendant because of his or her
prior convictions.416
The prejudicial effect of prior conviction evidence is not limited to
crimes which do not involve dishonesty or deceit. If it were true that
jurors actually used the information only to weigh the credibility of
the witness, then the argument that a prosecutor should be allowed to
impeach a defendant with prior convictions involving dishonesty
would have much more force than it does. The simple fact is that
jurors use such evidence to infer that the defendant had a propensity
to commit crime and, therefore, committed the crime with which he or
she is charged.4" 7 Such assumptions are made even when the prior
conviction evidence is for crimes involving dishonesty.
Proponents of Rule 609 have been quite adamant about the need
for the jury to have such evidence. 418 Apparently there is an underly-
ing belief that without such information, the jury might just take the
defendant at his or her word. Social science shows this is false.419 Ju-
rors do not take the defendant at his or her word.4 z° Jurors are aware
that a defendant has much to lose if he or she is convicted. They are
also aware that if the defendant committed a crime, he or she would
certainly lie about committing that crime.42  The study by Wissler
and Saks showed that jurors were skeptical about a defendant's credi-
There may be some prejudice to the defendant, I recognize, in admitting evidence that the
defendant has previously been convicted of a felony. But to a substantial degree, this preju-
dice can be instigated by an introduction to the jury that the prior convictions are admitted
only for purposes of impeaching the credibility of the witness and not to prove any propen-
sity on the part of the defendant to be a felon.
Id. at 37077. Senator McClellan stated:
[Disallowing prior conviction evidence] is premised on the fear that the use of prior convic-
tions to establish a lack of credibility of the witness will tempt juries to convict the defend-
ant simply on the basis of his prior criminal record rather than base their verdict on the facts
relating to the charges on which the defendant is being tried. The court's instructions, of
course, preclude the jury from using prior convictions in this way.
Id. at 37076 (emphasis added).
414. See discussion supra notes 279-360 and accompanying text.
415. See discussion supra notes 279-360 and accompanying text.
416. See discussion supra notes 328-346 and accompanying text.
417. See discussion supra notes 385-389 and accompanying text.
418. See supra note 415.
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bility even when they were unaware of his or her prior conviction evi-
dence.422 Wissler and Saks wrote:
The defendant's credibility is already so much lower than that of the
other witnesses (because it obviously is in the defendant's self-interest
to give testimony which favors his or her position) that the admission
of prior convictions does not reduce the credibility of the defendant
further.423
Moreover, there is no reason why a prosecutor cannot argue in closing
that the defendant is not credible because of his or her self-interest in
the outcome of the trial. In short, the assertion by proponents of Rule
609 that juries need information of prior convictions to properly weigh
a defendant's credibility has no basis in fact.
It is odd that proponents of Rule 609 assume jurors are incapable of
determining that the defendant has everything to gain and nothing to
lose by lying. At the same time, proponents assume that jurors are
capable of understanding and following a legal instruction to consider
prior conviction evidence only as it weights on a defendant's credibil-
ity. Ironically, proponents of Rule 609 assume jurors know little
about human nature, but at the same time they assume that jurors will
be able to follow a complex legal instruction. Studies show that
neither of these assumptions are correct. Jurors do realize that a de-
fendant has every reason to lie on the stand. However, jurors seldom
understand and follow a judge's limiting instruction.
The only way to cure the prejudicial effects of prior conviction evi-
dence at criminal trials is to disallow such evidence altogether. The
"risk of prejudice to the defense in greater than the unrealized poten-
tial benefit to the prosecution. A change of the rules to exclude evi-
dence of prior convictions for defendants would protect defendants
while not disabling the prosecutor. '424 Even commentators opposed
to limiting the information a jury hears have recognized the need to
exclude evidence of prior convictions from the jurors' ears.4 25 One
group of commentators argued that blindfolding jurors by excluding
certain types of evidence, such as auto insurance coverage, was unwise
because it was based on unfounded assumptions.426 These commenta-
tors argued that if jurors were not informed about laws, such as
mandatory insurance for drivers, jurors would base decisions on their
own personal knowledge of the law instead of the judge's instruc-
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. See Wissler & Saks, supra note 294, at 47.
425. See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury, 52 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 247, 247-267 (1989).
426. Id. at 248-49.
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tion 27 They argued jurors should be informed about information,
such as insurance, which has traditionally been excluded at trial.428
The group recognized, however, that the prejudice to criminal defend-
ants was well-proven, and that the only way to prevent this prejudice
was to blindfold the jury and preclude prior conviction evidence
altogether.429
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the numerous problems with Rule 609 and similar state rules,
a per se rule disallowing prior conviction evidence should be adopted.
Such a rule would protect criminal defendants and be consistent with
the underlying policies of the Constitution and American criminal
law. It is doubtful such a rule would have a negative impact on con-
viction rates, and it would better insure that jurors convict for the
right reasons. Jurors would not be tempted to convict simply because
they believed that the defendant had a propensity to commit crimes or
was a bad person. Rather, jurors would have to evaluate the specific
facts of the case and determine if the State has met its burden of
proof. Such a rule would afford defendants a way out of the dilemma
created by the current rule. The proposed rule would have the added
benefit of promoting criminal defendants to testify. This would pro-
vide the jurors with more information to make an informed decision
about a verdict. Such a rule would not severely limit the prosecution.
While prosecutors would not be allowed to bring in prior conviction
evidence, they would still be allowed full cross-examination. Also,
prosecutors would still be allowed to argue to the jury that the defend-
ant is not believable because he or she in fact committed the crime
and now has every reason to lie about it.
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia, Montana and England have
adopted such a rule, but all have recognized exceptions to the rule
when the defendant actively misleads the jury. In such cases, each of
these jurisdictions have allowed the use of prior conviction evidence
to impeach. When a defendant with prior convictions tries to bolster
his or her credibility in this way, impeachment by prior conviction evi-
dence should be allowed. Case law from jurisdictions ordinarily
preventing the use of prior conviction evidence would be useful in
providing state and federal courts guidance in the application of the
proposed rule.
427. Id. at 249-52.
428. Id. at 267.
429. Id. at 261-62.
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